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This chapter discusses the issue on the regional connectivity in continental ASEAN, 
in the context of developing the international production networks (hereafter IPNs). We 
herein focus on Mekong economies (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) as continental ASEAN. The chapter III showed that the IPNs have been 
evolved in Mekong region, but mainly in the bilateral area between Thailand and 
Vietnam. In this sense, the IPNs in Mekong region still stay at the beginning stage of 
development, and thus there is the serious need to enhance the regional connectivity in 
this area. When we think about the regional connectivity in the context of continental 
area, the national land-borders are critical areas, which can at the same time be the 
gateways for the IPN penetration across the countries. This chapter first examines 
Mekong region’s connectivity through the analysis of the gravity trade model and its 
modified fragmentation model. And it also discusses the strategy for the development of 
border areas as the gateways of the IPNs. 
 
1. Connectivity in Mekong Region: Analysis of Gravity Trade Model 
 
When we recall the “fragmentation theory” described in the chapter III, the larger 
differences in location advantages and the lower the service-link costs encourage firms 
to facilitate the fragmentation. As far as we see the differences in location advantages, 
the Mekong region seems to have the greatest potential of the evolution of IPNs through 
the fragmentation. It is because there are large differences in location advantages in the 
region, as we can see typically in the big gap in GDP per capita between Thailand with 
about 5,000 US dollars and the other Mekong economies with around 1,000 US 
dollars.
1
 Mekong countries except Thailand and Vietnam, however, show the highest 
level of service-link costs as discussed later. 
This section addresses the issue on Mekong region’s connectivity on quantitative 
base, specifically by clarifying to what extent the region’s service-link costs prevent the 
fragmentation, namely, the IPNs from developing in that region, through the analysis of 
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 According to the World Economic Outlook Database of International Monetary Fund (October 
2013), the GDP per capita in 2010 of Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam are 
4,740 US dollars, 753 US dollars, 1,072 US dollars, 811 US dollars, and 1,298 US dollars, 
respectively. 
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the gravity trade model and its modified fragmentation model.
2
 The rest of this section 
is organized as follows. The sub-section 1.1 specifies our empirical framework of the 
gravity trade model and its modified fragmentation model. After introducing our data 
sources in the sub-section 1.2, the sub-section 1.3 reports our estimation results. The last 
sub-section 1.4 summarizes the estimation outcomes. 
 
1.1 Empirical Framework 
There have so far been no studies examining the mechanics of fragmentation for 
Mekong region. Using the gravity model, a few studies examine the trade integration in 
this region. Poncet (2006) examined the trade-intensity of Yunnan, Chinese province 
with Mekong and ASEAN countries. Edmonds and Fujimura (2008) investigated the 
impact of cross-border road infrastructure on trade (and foreign direct investment) in the 
intra-Greater Mekong Subregion. These two studies are the pioneers to deal with 
Mekong region in the context of gravity trade model, but do not step into the recent 
issue of fragmentation, namely, IPNs in Mekong region. 
This study tries to contribute to the gravity-model literature by modifying the 
gravity model for examining the adaptability of fragmentation to Mekong region. 
Following Kimura et al. (2007), we estimate the modified version of gravity equation. 
Specifically, we introduce absolute gap in GDP per capita between trading countries as 
a proxy for location advantage disparity. Furthermore, this study introduces a variable 
capturing the extent of logistics development in order to examine the role of service-link 
costs. 
In the model, we target the trade of machinery parts and components between 
Thailand and trade partners including the other Mekong countries. Since the 
fragmentation is associated with active back-and-forth international transactions of 
intermediate goods, we explore trade in intermediate goods to examine the mechanics of 
fragmentation. We select the machinery industry since it occupies the major parts in the 
IPNs. Our focus on Thailand’s trade is because Thailand has played a central role in the 
intra-trade and the intra-investment within Mekong region. 
We then specify three versions of models – ordinary gravity trade model, the model 
considering one of the fragmentation factors (the difference in location advantages), and 
the model including two of fragmentation factors (the difference in location advantages 
and the service-link costs). 
 
Ordinary Gravity Trade Model 
In the original form, the gravity equation explains bilateral trade flows by the 
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 The essence of this section relies on Taguchi and Ni Lar (2013). 
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economic size of two countries and the distance between them. Since Anderson (1979), 
trade theorists have found that the gravity model equation is consistent with various 
kinds of trade theories (e.g., Helpman and Krugman (1985), Deardorff (1998)). 
Furthermore, Bergstrand (1989) developed the augmented version of the gravity model 
by including per capita income levels for both exporters and importers as additional 
regressors.
3
 The first model is, thus, a usual augmented version of gravity equation as 
follows: 
 
ln Tradeit = α1 * ln Joint GDPit + β1 * ln Joint GDP per capitait + γ1 * ln Distancei 
+ 1 * ln REXit + Dit δ1 + ut + εit                   (1) 
 
where the subscript t and i denote year and Thailand’s trading partner country, 
respectively. Tradeit is exports or imports of machinery parts and components between 
Thailand and country i in year t. Joint GDPit represents a product of GDP in Thailand 
and country i, and Joint GDP per capitait is a product of GDP per capita in Thailand and 
country i. Distancei is the geographical distance between the capital cities of Thailand 
and its trading partner i. REXit is the real exchange rate in the bilateral term between 
Thailand and its trading partner i in year t.
4
 ut is year fixed effects. α, β, γ, , δ and  
are coefficients to be estimated. ε is the disturbance term. 
Dit is a vector of dummy variables that take the value of one for a specific trading 
partner which is supposed to have IPNs with Thailand. Such partners include four 
Mekong-region countries (i.e., Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam), which we 
call “CLMV”, and the other four ASEAN countries (i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Singapore), which we call “advanced ASEAN”. Equation (1a) includes 
the dummy for CLMV and advanced ASEAN for their comparison, and equation (1b) 
focuses the dummy on only the one for CLMV. Those dummy variables are further 
divided into the periods –1990-95, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010. A vector of 
coefficients for dummy variables, δ1, is useful for identifying the intensity of trade with 
Thailand in machinery parts and components. A positive and statistically significant 
coefficient means that their trade flows with Thailand exceed the level predicted by the 
gravity elements, thereby implying the existence of IPNs between Thailand and its 
partners. 
One of the recent issues in the gravity model is how to control for multilateral 
resistance terms (Anderson and Wincoop (2003)). To do that, for example, Feenstra 
                                                 
3
 The augmented version of the gravity model has been widely used in empirical studies of 
international trade flows. See, e.g. Frankel et al. (1995) and Stack (2009). 
4
 We define the real exchange rate, e.g. between Thailand and Japan, by [(Japanese yen per Thai 
baht)] * [CPI in Thailand] / [CPI in Japan].  
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(2002) proposed to include importer and exporter fixed effects. However, the 
introduction of those fixed effects forces us to drop one of our main variables, i.e. Dit. 
Thus, following Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010), we introduce the bilateral real 
exchange rate, i.e., REX, to control for multilateral resistance terms; a negative sign in 
 in Thailand’s exports and a positive sign in Thailand’s imports are expected 
respectively. 
 
Fragmentation Model: Location Advantages 
The second gravity equation, which we follow from Kimura et al. (2007), is 
specifically designed to identify one of the key factors of fragmentation – the difference 
in location advantages; we introduce the gap in per capita GDP between Thailand and 
its partner, which is denoted by GAPit, instead of joint GDP per capita of both countries 
as follows: 
 
ln Tradeit = α2 * ln Joint GDPit + β2 * ln GAPit + γ2 * ln Distancei 
+ 2 * ln REXit + Dit δ2 + ut + εit                   (2) 
 
Since the per-capita-GDP gap should be shown by a positive scale, the gap is 
described as the logarithm of the square of the differential in per capita GDP between 
Thailand and its trade partner. If we get a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
β2, accompanied with the smaller coefficient of a dummy variable, δ2, than δ1, the 
intensity of trade integration of machinery parts and components might be partly 
explained by one of the fragmentation factors, i.e. the difference in location advantages 
represented by the gap in per capita GDP. Equation (2) focuses the dummy, Dit, on 
CLMV. 
 
Fragmentation Model: Location Advantages and Service-link Costs 
The third gravity equation is to add to equation (2) one more key factor of 
fragmentation – the service-link costs; we insert the Logistic Performance Index (LPI) 
presented by the World Bank of each country as a proxy of the reverse of service-link 
costs as follows: 
 
ln Tradeit = α3 * ln Joint GDPit + β3 * ln GAPit + γ3 * ln Distancei 
+ 3 * ln LPIit / ln GDP per capitait + 3 * ln REXit + Dit δ3 + ut + εit   (3) 
 
However, LPI may be correlated with many other factors, particularly economic 
development. In order to isolate the extent of logistics performance to some extent, we 
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introduce the logarithm of LPI divided by the logarithm of per capita GDP in each trade 
partner. Our concern in this equation is the impacts of the inclusion of service-link costs 
on the other coefficients; if the coefficient of LPI, 3, is a positive and statistically 
significant, and at the same time if the coefficient of a dummy variable, δ3, create the 
difference from those in equation (1) and (2), it implies that the intensity of trade 
integration of machinery parts and components might be affected by another 
fragmentation factor, i.e. service-link costs represented by the LPI. Equation (3) also 
focuses the dummy, Dit, on CLMV. 
 
1.2 Data Issues 
In this section, we provide our data sources and take simple overview of Thailand’s 
trade of machinery parts and components. For estimating the equation (1) and (2), we 
construct panel data for the period between 1990 and 2010 with 199 countries as 
Thailand’s trading partners. As for the equation (3), the period for the panel data is 
confined to the one from 2005 to 2010 due to the data constraint of LPI. The data of LPI 
is available only in 2007 and 2010, and thus we assume that the LPI variable during 
2005 to 2007 would be the same as the LPI data in 2007, and its variable during 2008 to 
2010 would be the same as its data in 2010. We estimate the equation (1), (2) and (3) for 
Thailand’s exports and imports respectively, since we could see the different trends in 
its exports and imports as shown below. To avoid the problem of sample selection bias 
in our panel data, we adopt the censored regression model (Tobit model) with dependent 
variables left-censored at zero and with the distribution for the error term extreme value. 
As for the source of the annual data used for estimation, the bilateral trade data of 
machinery parts and components with Thailand in terms of the export and import values 
of U.S. dollar are retrieved from the “United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database” (UN Comtrade).5 The data on GDP and per capita GDP on U.S. dollar base 
comes from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”.6 The geographical 
distance between Thailand and each trading partners is measured by the “greater circle” 
distance formula between Bangkok (the capital of Thailand) and the capital city of each 
country.
7
 The LPI data comes from the database of the World Bank.
8
 The components 
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 As for the definition of “machinery parts and components”, see Kimura and Obashi (2010) (HS 
1992 classification). The UN Comtrade can be accessed by http://comtrade.un.org/db. 
6
 Regarding with the data for Myanmar, since there is no data in the World Bank’s “World 
Development Indicators”, we alternatively use the data from World Economic Outlook Database, 
October 2010 and 2012, by International Monetary Fund. 
7
 For the calculation of “greater circle” distance, the website, http://www.distancebetweencities.us, 
is available. 
8
 See the website below. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,contentMDK:23196552~pa
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of the real exchange rate, nominal exchange rate and CPI are retrieved from 
International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund.  
Table 1 indicates the trade values of machinery parts and components, their shares 
and growths of Thailand with major trading partners in terms of its exports (the upper 
part of Table) and its imports (its lower part) in 1990, 2000 and 2010. The rough 
findings on their trends are as follows. First, Thailand’s trade of machinery parts and 
components with CLMV has rapidly expanded its share from 1990 to 2010, and the 
export expansion exceeds the import one. Among CLMV, the export to Vietnam 
signifies a remarkable increase. The level of trade shares with CLMV are, however, still 
far below that with advanced ASEAM in 2010. Second, Thailand’s trade shares with 
advanced ASEAN, as far as we see their changes from 2000 to 2010, have declined in 
both of Thailand’s exports and imports. The trade growths for 2000 - 2010 with 
advanced ASEAN are lower than those with CLMV in any trade cases. Third, regarding 
Thailand’s trade with the other major trading partners, it should be noted that Thailand’s 
trade shares with Japan and United States have declined during 1990-2010 period, 
whereas the trade share with China and India has grown in any cases.  
 
1.3 Empirical Results 
This section first shows the estimation results and then discusses the estimation 
outcomes. Table 2 reports the results of the gravity model estimations on Thailand’s 
trades of machinery parts and components: Table 2a on its exports and Table 2b on its 
imports. The gravity model estimations include the ordinary model of equation (1):  
(1a) including the dummy for CLMV and advanced ASEAN and (1b) including the 
dummy only for CLMV, and the model modified by fragmentation factors, equation (2) 
and (3). 
 
Findings: Ordinary Model: Equation (1) 
The results in ordinary model, i.e., equation (1), are as follows. In this estimation, 
we could verify the validity of the ordinary gravity trade model through the estimations 
of both Thailand’s exports and imports of machinery parts and components. The basic 
explanatory variables have the expected signs with statistical significance at the 
one-percent level: the coefficient of joint GDP is significantly positive; the one of joint 
per capita GDP is significantly positive; the one of geographical distance is significantly 
negative; and the one of real exchange rate has an expected sign though not significant 
in the case of imports. 
Our concern is the coefficients of dummy variables to describe the intensity of trade 
                                                                                                                                               
gePK:148956~theSitePK:239071,00.html 
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integration beyond the gravity-model level, which are introduced for CLMV and 
advanced ASEAN in equation (1a). The significantly positive coefficient means that the 
Thailand’s trade with the partner exceeds the gravity-model standard. Thailand’s exports 
show their intensity beyond the standard with both of CLMV and advanced ASEAN, 
except Myanmar (2006-2010) and Vietnam (1990-1995). On the other hand, Thailand’s 
imports indicate their intensity with advanced ASEAN, but only with Lao PDR 
(2006-2010) and Vietnam (1996-2010) in CLMV. When we focus on equation (1b), 
Thailand imports represent even disintegration below the standard with Cambodia and 
Myanmar, and lose their intensity with Lao PDR (2006-2010). 
 
Findings: Fragmentation Model: Equation (2) 
In equation (2), as is consistent with our expectation, we can see significantly 
positive coefficients for Gap of GDP per capita in both cases of exports and imports. 
This result implies that Thailand gets engaged in back-and-forth transactions of 
machinery parts and components based on the differences in location advantages with 
trading partners. The results in Joint GDP and Distance are qualitatively unchanged with 
those in equation (1). The coefficient for REX turns out to be significantly positive in 
the case of imports, which is consistent with our expectation.  
Our concern here is how the coefficients of dummy variables showing trade 
intensity are affected in terms of statistical inferences, by inserting the gap in per capita 
GDP, i.e. one of the fragmentation factors. The coefficients of trade intensity decline in 
all cases in the 32 cases (4 periods of 4 countries in Thailand’s exports and imports) 
compared with those in ordinary gravity model of equation (1b), even if the degrees of 
the decline are not so large in some cases. In particular, when we focus on the 8 cases in 
which trade intensity beyond the gravity-model standard was significantly identified in 
equation (1b), there are the 6 cases in which their trade intensity becomes insignificant 
in equation (2) –the import from Vietnam (1996-2005), the exports to Cambodia 
(1990-2000), and the exports to Lao PDR (1990-1995 and 2001-2005). 
 
Findings: Fragmentation Model: Equation (3) 
Lastly, the results for equation (3) are as follows. The results in Joint GDP, Joint 
GDP per capita, Gap of GDP per capita, Distance, and REX do not change qualitatively 
compared with those in equation (2) in Thailand imports, though there are unexpected 
signs of Gap and REX in Thailand’s exports.9 The coefficients for LPI divided by per 
capita GDP is significantly positive, indicating that the better quality of logistics in 
                                                 
9
 This instability of the coefficients may come from the limited number of samples in the estimation 
of equation (3). 
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trading partners increases significantly trade of machinery parts and components with 
Thailand. 
Again, we can see some changes in the coefficients of trade intensity by inserting 
the variables showing service-link costs. When we focus on the valid equation of 
Thailand imports, the trade intensity is absorbed into the standard level in the imports 
from Vietnam. Another noteworthy finding is that the disintegration effects below the 
gravity model standard in the imports from Cambodia and Myanmar in equation (2) are 
mitigated in Cambodia and even absorbed in Myanmar. 
 
Discussions 
We now discuss the implications of the above-mentioned findings from the 
estimations of the gravity-trade and fragmentation model. First, the trade integration of 
machinery parts and components was identified in terms of the trade intensity beyond 
the gravity model standard in Thailand’s trade with Vietnam after 1996 and advanced 
ASEAN. With regard to the trade with other Mekong economies, Thailand’s imports of 
machinery parts and components are disintegrated especially in those from Cambodia 
and Myanmar, whereas Thailand’s exports are well-integrated to Cambodia and Lao 
PDR. These observations imply that the international production networks have been 
evolved between Thailand and Vietnam as well as the other advanced ASEAN in such 
full-fledged terms as two-way trade of machinery parts and components, and that the 
other Mekong economies have not incorporated in the production networks due to 
one-way or disintegrated trade with Thailand. Cambodia and Lao PDR, though having 
accepted machinery parts and components from Thailand, have not yet equipped the 
capacity enough to supply machinery parts and components. 
Second, the Thailand’s trade intensity of machinery parts and components could be 
partly explained by the fragmentation factors, i.e. the gap in per capita GDP and 
service-link costs through the fragmentation-model estimation, especially in the case of 
Vietnam. With regard to service-link costs, Vietnam is in the favorable position in its 
logistic performance. Table 3 shows that the level of the Logistics Performance Index in 
Vietnam is very close to that of Philippines and Indonesia though the per capita GDP in 
Vietnam still stay at the lower level (around 1,000 US dollars) than those of advanced 
ASEAN. In Vietnam, its better performance in service-link costs relative to per capita 
GDP may contribute to the trade intensity of machinery parts and components with 
Thailand. 
Third, the Thailand’s trade disintegration of machinery parts and components with 
Cambodia and Myanmar could be illustrated by their higher service-link costs through 
the fragmentation-model estimation. It was clearly observed from the estimation 
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outcome that the disintegration effects below the gravity model standard in Thailand’s 
imports from Cambodia and Myanmar were mitigated or absorbed under the 
fragmentation model including service-link-cost variable. Table 3 again tells us that the 
level of the Logistics Performance Index in Cambodia and Myanmar are still at the 
lowest level in ASEAN. It can be said that it would be the existence of the higher 
service-link costs that prevents such latecomer’s economies as Cambodia and Myanmar 
from being involved in IPNs, although they might be in the better position in terms of 
their location advantages, i.e. the lower factor prices like wages. 
 
1.4 Summary 
This section examined the issue on Mekong region’s connectivity on quantitative 
base through the analysis of the gravity trade model and its modified fragmentation 
model. The main findings are as follows: First, the evolution of IPNs between Thailand 
and Vietnam as well as the other advanced ASEAN could be identified in terms of their 
two-way trade integration of machinery parts and components beyond the gravity trade 
standard. Second, the trade intensity of machinery parts and components, in particular, 
the one between Thailand and Vietnam, could be partly explained by the fragmentation 
factors, i.e. their gaps in per capita GDP and the relatively lower service-link costs in 
Vietnam, through the fragmentation-model estimation. Third, the trade disintegration of 
machinery parts and components between Thailand and Mekong latecomers, such as 
Cambodia and Myanmar, could be explained by their higher service-link costs also 
through the fragmentation-model estimation. The strategic implication lies in the 
significance in enhancing regional connectivity by reducing the service-link costs for 
the further penetration of IPNs at the edge of Mekong region. 
 
2. Developing Border Areas as Gateways of IPNs in Mekong Region 
 
For enhancing the connectivity in Mekong region, which is a continental area 
composed of five countries, national land-borders should be put in the highest attention 
as critical areas where any kinds of differences in countries should be coordinated and 
harmonized. If the border area development were carefully designed, the border areas 
might be the real gateways for IPN penetration across the countries in Mekong region. 
This section first comes up with basic concept for border area development, then picks 
up case studies of such forerunners as the US-Mexico border (often named “Maquila”) 
and the Thai-Lao PDR border (Savannakhet) for extracting their lessons, and finally 
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discusses the strategies focusing on Thai-Myanmar border area development.
10
  
 
2.1 Basic Concept for Border Area Development – Maximizing “Border Bonuses” 
The border areas have their own area-advantages, which we call “border bonuses”. 
They are “complementary factor endowment” and “cross-border infrastructure 
services”.11  To be specific, an industry located in border areas can enjoy the close 
availability of lower-cost labor forces from the less-developed country and of other 
inputs (intermediate products, capital and technology) from the more-developed country. 
At the same time, an industry can avoid high service-link costs and unstable utility 
services that accrue from underdeveloped infrastructure in the less-developed country, 
by utilizing cross-border infrastructure services provided from the more-developed 
country and the third organizations. These bonuses, thus, would be enlarged, when there 
is a big gap in their income levels between the countries crossing the border.   
 
Complementary Factor Endowment 
From an economic point of view, a border is nothing but an impediment to free 
mobility of production inputs: labor, capital, technology and information. Just because 
of the existence of border impediment, however, a border creates differences in factor 
availabilities and in factor prices across the border, and thus complementary inputs 
become available so that a border industry can combine them to produce 
cost-competitive products. In fact, in accordance with the big gap in per capita GDP 
between Thailand and neighboring countries in Mekong region as stated in the footnote 
1, Thailand can offer such inputs as parts and components, technology and capital, 
while the neighboring countries can provide lower-waged and affluent labor forces. 
According to the 23rd Survey of Investment Related Costs in Asia and Oceania (FY 
2012 survey) by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), the factory-worker's 
monthly base salaries are 53 US dollars in Yangon, 74 US dollars in Phnom Penh, and 
132 US dollars in Vientiane, while it is 345 US dollars in Bangkok.  
 
Cross-border Infrastructure Services 
Border areas, even if they are located in less-developed countries, can avoid high 
service-link costs and unstable utility services. It is because cross-border infrastructure 
services have often been provided from neighboring advanced countries, the third 
countries and international organizations. The advanced countries have an incentive to 
provide necessary infrastructure for their firms to invest its neighboring countries, and 
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the third countries and international organizations expect some spill-over effects beyond 
one country through developing the cross-border infrastructure. In fact, in Mekong 
region, there have been several cases in which Thai Government provided financial 
assistances to construct the roads in the border areas in Cambodia and Myanmar. The 
construction of the Second International Friendship Bridge across the Mekong River 
between Thailand and Lao PDR was financed by Japanese Official Development 
Assistance. A border industry in neighboring countries from Thailand can enjoy the 
cross-border infrastructure as well as the better access to utility services such as 
electricity, water, and telecommunication that are provided by Thailand. In addition, 
border companies can also gain the transportation access to the well-developed Laem 
Chabang Port through well-connected road networks in Thailand. 
 
These border bonuses may provide a favorable opportunity for border areas to invite 
and accept the IPNs in Mekong region, since the bonuses imply better combination of 
the larger differences in location advantages and the lower the service-link costs, which 
are the two key factors for “fragmentation”. As matter of facts, Figure 1 indicate that 
there have been several emerging industrial zones at border areas in Mekong region, 
such as Savannakhet, Dansavann-Lao Bao, Poipet, Koh Kong and Bavet-Moc Bai as 
active zones, and Myawaddy-Mae Sot and Dawei-Hit Khee as planned zones. In these 
zones, the branch factories and twin factories from Thailand and some other countries 
have been and are planned to be operating as the gateways of the IPNs in Mekong 
region. The basic concept for border area development is, therefore, to fully utilize the 
border bonuses for the further extension of the IPNs in Mekong region. For that, there 
should be several strategies for border area development: careful designing of 
institutional frameworks for Special Economic Zone (SEZ), enhancing outer-link 
connectivity from borders to central cities, and securing labor forces with skill 
developments. These strategies will be discussed at the later sub-section.  
 
2.2 Case Study: “Maquila” at US-Mexico border 
This sub-section introduces the case study on the “Maquila” at US-Mexico border 
by presenting its content, historical performances, recent challenges and lessons. The 
reason why we pick up this case is that the “Maquila” system, the Mexican “in-bond 
processing” program is said to be the most successful case as a border area development 
in the world, since it has contributed a lot to the development of Mexican economy as 
well as of the US border cities from its spillover effects, though it has faced several 
challenges under fierce global competition. We first clarify what is the Maquila 
program. 
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2.2.1 The Maquila Program 
We herein highlight the essence of its original program. The Maquila program is 
essentially an “in-bond processing” system and its precise definition is shown by Baz 
(2007) as follows. “A Maquila program entitles the company, first, to foreign 
investment participation in the capital -- and in management -- of up to 100% without 
need of any special authorization; second, it entitles the company to special customs 
treatment, allowing duty free temporary import of machinery, equipment, parts and 
materials, and administrative equipment such as computers, and communications 
devices, subject only to posting a bond guaranteeing that such goods will not remain in 
Mexico permanently.” Another important element is that the program permits the 
companies to bring whatever professional or personnel to serve as managers, 
technicians and other specialists. These foreigners can obtain non-immigrant visas, 
effective for six months and renewable as often as may be necessary. 
The “Maquiladora” that is often referred to is a Mexican Corporation which 
operates under the Maquila program approved by the Mexican Secretariat of Commerce 
and Industrial Development. These in-bond processing system has been an instrument to 
subsidize foreign manufacturers just like the US mother factories that set up their twin 
plants on the Mexico side of the border for processing and assembling their products on 
commission. The processed and assembled products in Mexico are re-exported by no 
less than 80 percent again to the US with a low import duty on the value-added in 
Mexico only. The US-GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) is also applied where if 
35 percent or more of the product is deemed Mexican content, it may enter duty free. 
 
2.2.2 Historical Performances 
The Maquila program started in 1965 as response to the termination of the US 
Bracero Program that had allowed Mexican migrants to work legally in the US on a 
seasonal basis to fulfill US agricultural labor demand. The Maquila enjoyed its heydays 
in the 1980s and the 1990s. The first background was the peso devaluations in 1982 and 
1994, which substantially reduced peso-denominated costs for the Maquiladoras and 
attracted more foreign companies to Mexico. Second, Mexico joined free trade 
framework: GATT in 1986, FTA with Chile in 1992, and NAFTA with the US and 
Canada in 1994. Consequently maximum tariff rates in Mexico fell from 60 percent to 
15 percent by 1990.
12
 Based on these backgrounds, the Maquila had shown excellent 
performances in Mexico. According to Gotjidooz and Vasigh (2009), the manufacturing 
production in Maquiladora had grown twofold from 1993 to 2000; the employment and 
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new establishments in the Maquiladora, recording double-digit growth in the 1980s and 
the 1990s, reached their highest levels in 2000: 3,700 plants and 1.3 million 
employment; and Maquiladora exports accounted for half of Mexico’s total exports. 
The Maquila had also brought good impacts on the US economy through the 
spillover effects to the US border city’s employment. Hanson (2001) found that a 10 
percent increase in Maquiladora’s production in Mexican border cities leads to a 1.1 to 
2.0 percent employment increase in U.S. border cities. Canas et al. (2011), in updating 
Hanson (2001)’s results, also found that the impact of a 10 percent increase in 
Maquiladora production leads to a 0.5 to 0.9 percent change in employment in the US 
border cities. 
 
2.2.3 Recent Challenges 
We next pick up two major recent challenges for the Maquila: fierce global 
competition with industrial evolutions, and inconsistency of the Maquila framework. 
The Maquila industry has faced fierce global competition, in particular, from China, 
Central America and the Caribbean in terms of labor costs. The real appreciation of the 
peso in the 2000s has strengthened such pressure. As a matter of fact, among the 
suppliers of imports to the US, Mexico’s ranking had exceeded China’s one until 2002, 
but after 2003 its ranking has reversed. When we look at the sector-wise shares, 
however, there has been no change in the machinery sector, whereas the China’s share 
of textiles and apparel products has become dominant in the US imports.
13
 On this 
point Watkins (2002) argued that Mexico can compete with China in high to medium 
value-added sectors such as appliances and medical goods, while China has gained in 
low-value-added sectors such as apparel, luggage, and footwear. There is a further view 
on the evolutional changes of the Maquila manufacturing operation. Carrillo and Lara 
(2005) described the industrial evolution by classifying Maquiladoras into four stages: 
the assembly stage (assembly in Mexico); the manufacturing stage (made in Mexico); 
the design stage (created in Mexico); and the stage of multiple-coordination activities 
based on information technology (coordination from Mexico). The actual trends in the 
value-added and productivity in the Maquila manufacturing in the 2000s have reflected 
its industrial evolutions (see Canas and Gilmer (2007)). In accordance with the industry 
evolved, the Maquiladoras have changed their geographical locations, just as the apparel 
sector opted for the lower wages of central Mexico (see Canas and Gilmer (2009)). 
Regarding with the inconsistency of the Maquila framework, the 1998 tax-law 
changes as “permanent establishment (PE)” in Mexico and NAFTA Article 303 threw 
the Maquila industry into confusion in income and custom taxation. The PE clause 
                                                 
13
 The data comes from US Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division. 
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required the Maquiladoras to pay Mexican income taxes in the same way as the 
domestic companies. It caused some firms to withdraw from Mexico, to downsize their 
operations, or to be discouraged from new foreign direct investment in Mexico. As for 
NAFTA Article 303, it eliminated duty drawback (or refunds of duties) for inputs from 
non-NAFTA origin as of January 1, 2001, if the final products incorporating these 
inputs were to be subsequently exported to another NAFTA country. The Maquila 
industry anticipated a large negative effect on operations, since the Maquilaforas of 
Asian companies were dependent upon certain inputs from the Far East. In response to 
the industry’s appeals, the Mexican government passed a decree creating 20 Sectoral 
Promotion Programs to protect the tariff-free entry of non-NAFTA components. Though 
it allows companies to apply for reduced tariffs of 0 to 5 percent, they must undertake 
extensive paperwork to track the origin of thousands of parts. 
 
2.2.4 Lessons 
We extract some lessons from the challenges the Maquila has faced as follows. 
First, the program for the “in-bond processing” should be carefully designed in 
relation to other frameworks like free trade agreements and to its historical trends. The 
facts pointed out that the NAFTA agreement phased out some of Maquila benefits and 
the change in tax system gave a disincentive for further investment of the Maquila 
industry. Several privileges for the “in-bond processing”, once established, should be 
secured independently from other frameworks and in a way of time-consistency.  
Second, industrial evolution should be continuously promoted under fierce global 
competition. The Maquila industry has experienced its generation alternation, and has 
still kept the improvements in its value-added and productivity with geographical 
expansion. As prerequisites for industrial evolution, Gotjidooz and Vasigh (2009) 
suggested “improvement of labor skills” and “modernization of infrastructure”. The 
success of Maquiladora requires a large number of highly educated workers, while there 
is a low level of educational attainment in the economically active population along the 
border areas. The improvement of Mexico’s infrastructure is also critical with a typical 
example of road network along with the geographical expansion of the Maquila industry 
towards inland areas. Although Mexico’s border areas can share the US adequate road 
networks, about 32 percent of the Mexican federal highways are still in poor condition. 
 
2.3 Case Study: Savannakhet at Thai-Lao PDR border 
This sub-section shows the case study on Savannakhet at Thai-Lao PDR border. 
There are mainly two reasons why we pick up this case. First, it is the case where the 
service-link costs have been rapidly declined with the construction of the Second 
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International Friendship Bridge across the Mekong River, together with the 
implementation of the institutional arrangement such as Cross Border Transportation 
Agreement (hereinafter, CBTA).
14
 Due to the lowering service-link costs, together with 
the wage gap between Thailand and Lao PDR, there has been a symptom for IPNs to be 
extended to this border area from Thailand. The second reason is that the border area of 
Savannakhet is the first area where the framework of SEZ was adopted in Lao PDR. In 
the process of the SEZ development, we could observe the skill-enhancement in the 
SEZ officials, which results in better business environment for foreign investors. 
 
2.3.1 Lowering Service-link Costs and IPN at Savannakhet 
It was expected that the construction of the Second International Friendship Bridge 
across the Mekong River would improve the advantage of the connectivity with 
Thailand for Lao PDR. Before the Bridge was constructed, in case that the Thai 
companies convey their freight by land, they had to depend only on the First 
International Friendship Bridge which connects between Nongkai in the border of 
Thailand and Vientiane, capital city of Lao PDR. In addition to the hard infrastructure, 
the soft infrastructure – logistics for transportation is another key to decrease the 
service-link costs. As mentioned above, CBTA has facilitated the institutional 
arrangement for enhancing the logistics performance. Under the CBTA framework, the 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Thailand and Lao PDR for Mukdahan 
and Savannakhet was concluded in 2005 for stipulating the detailed items for their 
cross-border transportation, and it has contributed a lot to increasing the border trade. 
When we see the figures of border trade released by the Bank of Thailand
15
, the increase 
of border trade through Mukdahan and Savannakhet is notable in recent years (see Table 
4). In fact, the share of the Mukdahan trade among northeastern Thai border trade was 
around 25% until 2006, but it increased drastically to almost 50% in 2012. The 
expansion of trade volume, at the same time, seems to contribute to the cost-reduction 
of transportation through economy of scale. 
The rapid reduction of service-link costs due to infrastructure development and SEZ 
formulation together with wage gap between Thailand and Lao PDR creates new 
opportunities to attract foreign investors and IPNs at Savannakhet. As a matter of fact, 
one Japanese camera-producing company which has mother plants in “Ayutthaya” at the 
                                                 
14
 Regarding with the Cross-Border Transport Agreement in Greater Mekong Subregion, see Ishida 
(2013). 
15
 Bank of Thailand collects the information of Customs Houses in the northeastern region and 
releases each borders trade value with Lao PDR through its website: 
http://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/RegionalEconFinance/Northeastern/Pages/ForeignTrade.as
px#. 
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central part of Thailand has just started to operate a new plant for assembling camera 
parts. It imports the assembled parts again into “Ayutthaya” to produce final goods with 
other parts. It is nothing more than a formation of the IPN extension to the border area 
of Lao PDR side, and a number of suppliers are expected to accompany that camera 
company by relocating their factories at Savannakhet.
16
  
 
2.3.2 Progress in SEZ at Savannakhet 
Savannakhet is located at the border area of Lao PDR side, which is close to the 
Second International Friendship Bridge across the Mekong River. Lao government had 
come up with the idea to set up SEZ in this area to create manufacturing-production 
sites for avoiding a mere pass-though role on the way of the East West Economic 
Corridor.
17
 The government issued its decree of Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone 
(hereafter, SaSEZ) in 2003 before the Bridge was open in the end of 2006. The     
SaSEZ offers to foreign investors such privileges as: corporate tax incentive, custom 
duty exemption, and preferential rates on land-lease, electricity and water charges. 
It is of course important to provide institutional arrangements for accepting foreign 
direct investment. It is, however, more critical to implement the privileged measures in 
prompt and appropriate ways. On this point, in an authority responsible for SaSEZ 
named Special Economic Zones Authority (hereafter, SEZA), there has been great 
progresses in the implementation capacity towards foreign investors. According to the 
Nozaki (2009), Japanese company to locate in SaSEZ had had complaints about the 
confusing explanations by the staff of SEZA. It had offered one stop service for both the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment on new investment projects and related ministries 
to supervise each industry that the investing companies belong to. However, the 
investing companies had had to visit Vientiane, capital city of Lao PDR many times to 
take procedures on their investment projects. On the contrary, when the authors 
conducted the interview-survey to newly investing companies at SaSEZ in August 2013, 
we heard from the companies no serious complaints and rather satisfactions toward 
SEZA’s performances. Since the institutional frameworks have not been changed, the 
behaviors and capacities of SEZA’s staffs should have been improved. During the five 
years, the staffs seem to have accumulated their experiences and developed their 
skills.
18
 
                                                 
16
 At present, however, the trades of intra-industrial products between Lao PDR and Thailand are 
not so large. It is because the Lao economy highly depends on the natural-resource-related industry. 
Most of Lao exports to Thailand are energy and materials, and more than half of Thai exports to 
Lao PDR are also energy and materials which come from refined fuel. See Nozaki (2014).  
17
 The idea of SEZ was based on JICA’s studies. 
18
 Regarding with issues on CBTA, the officials at the border also need their skill developments. 
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2.3.3 Acquisition of Labor Force at Savannakhet 
Savannakhet has its own advantage in addition to the usual “border bonuses” we 
already referred to. It is similarity of language with Thailand so that Lao people can 
understand Thai language. In case that Thai investors set up their factories at 
Savannakhet, they can dispatch Thai managers and technicians to handle the factories 
and make them train Lao workers with less communication gap. In this sense, the 
acquisition of skilled workers is not such a serious issue compared with the case of 
investing other neighboring countries.   
The problem is whether a number of semi-skilled factory-workers are available for 
new investors at Savannakhet. According to the Statistical Yearbook of Lao PDR (2012), 
population of Lao PDR is 6.39 million in 2011, which means that there are not so 
abundant number of labor force compared with neighboring countries such as Myanmar 
and Vietnam. Among total population, however, Savannakhet Province holds 922 
thousand people, which are more than Vientiane Capital of 783 thousand. In addition, it 
is said that many of Savannakhet-origin people have migrated to Thailand for work. If 
they had job opportunities in their home region, they might come back to take the job. 
In this regard, Savannakhet may provide labor forces for new investors to some extent. 
Whereas the licensed investment projects in SaSEZ up to August 2013 require 
tentatively around 2,500 workers, SEZA expects that the labor demand will grow as 
many as 10 to 15 thousand for the future prospect.
19
 It might become a serious issue to 
acquire necessary workers and to provide them with necessary trainings and educations 
at Savannakhet, in case this border SEZ accepted many investors. 
 
2.3.4 Lessons 
We extract the following two lessons from the experiences of the development of 
Savannakhet. First, it is true that the rapid development of SEZ framework as well as 
the hard and soft infrastructure at Savannakhet has been providing opportunities to 
attract foreign investors and thus participate in the IPNs mainly from Thailand. The 
emphasis should, however, be put on the significance in their implementation progress 
with capacity development of the officials of SEZA and border offices. In particular, 
transition economies such as Lao PDR should accumulate the experiences to be 
accustomed to market mechanism by communicating foreign investors. To concentrate 
limited manpower to the specific zone also contributes to making SEZ an 
investor-friendly industrial zone. Second, regarding with the issue of labor force, we 
should avoid the situation that the shortage of workers will be a bottleneck for border 
                                                 
19
 The authors interviewed the SEZA official in February 2012. 
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area development. The system of trainings and educations should be well-prepared for 
the supposed factory workers including migrant workers in Thailand. 
 
2.4 Strategies for Border Area Development Focusing on Thai-Myanmar Border 
We finally discuss the strategies for border area development based on 
aforementioned basic concept and lessons from case studies. When we look at the 
border areas in Mekong region, several industrial zones have been developed under the 
framework of SEZ as shown in Figure 1. The border areas in Myanmar across Thailand, 
however, have no operating industrial zones at present, and thus the areas would be the 
frontier to be developed as the gateway for the IPNs to extend from Thailand. Thus, we 
herein focus the strategies on those at Thai-Myanmar border areas. 
There are four border areas with main formal checkpoints (Thai border – Myanmar 
border): Mae Sai – Tachilek, Mae Sot – Myawaddy, Phu Nam Ron – Hit Hkee, and 
Ranong – Kawthaung. It is, however, only in Mae Sot where manufacturing production 
sites are located in Thailand side. Mae Sot has a large industrial agglomeration that is 
composed of labor-intensive manufacturing such as garment, textile, and 
food-processing. About 400 factories are located and around 20,000 migrants with legal 
qualification are working in Mae Sot. The Mae Sot industries had so far enjoyed 
relatively lower wages of migrant workers. The minimum-wage has, however, been 
raised to 300 baht since January in 2013. Then, most of factories has lost an advantage 
of lower wages since the minimum-wage has also been adapted to migrant workers, and 
thus they are facing the serious and urgent needs to save labor costs and to step up to 
high-value-added operations.
20
 On the other side, Myanmar has a policy demand to 
create job opportunities at the border area, Myawaddy, by inviting any production sites 
from Thailand, under its economic reformation to pursue “balanced, proportionate and 
inclusive growth”.21 It is at the border of Mae Sot – Myawaddy, therefore, where the 
“fragmentation” is needed. Specifically, the labor-intensive production blocks at Mae 
Sot are expected to be relocated to Myawaddy where lower-wage workers are instantly 
available. For Myawaddy side, the acceptance of production bases as the fragments of 
production networks may contribute to income generation and job creations in the areas, 
whereas for Mae Sot side the outsourcing of the labor-intensive production may save 
labor costs and make it easier for the border industries to concentrate on the higher 
                                                 
20
 The description here on Mae Sot is based on the interviews at Mae Sot on Oct.29 - Nov.1, 2012 
under the JICA research project “Job Creation by Border Area Development between Thailand and 
Myanmar”. Some of the factories have the plan to relocate factories to Cambodia or to central 
areas of Thailand with innovative facilities to save their labor-costs. 
21
 This strategy was declared by President U Thein Sein as the second phase of reform strategy in 
June, 2012. In fact, creating job opportunities in its border areas where most of minority groups 
are living would contribute to stabilizing the society and economy. 
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value-added operations. In this sense, the “fragmentation” would be a win-win strategy 
for both sides. 
Here comes the urgent necessity to facilitate the IPN extension through the 
“fragmentation” from Mae Sot to Myawaddy by the following strategies: careful 
designing of institutional frameworks for special economic zone (hereafter SEZ), 
enhancing outer-link connectivity from border to central cities, and securing labor 
forces with skill developments. 
 
Creating Institutional Frameworks for SEZ with Careful Designing 
One of the reasons why foreign manufacturing companies have not yet been 
invested so much in a border area consists in its higher institution-wise service-link 
costs. They are many restrictive regulations and heavy burdens imposed on foreign 
firms explicitly and implicitly: customs duties, minimum capital requirements, 
labor-immigration, export and import licenses, restriction on foreign currency 
transactions, restriction on using utility services such as electricity provided by foreign 
countries
22
, etc.  
The special economic zone (SEZ), including the free trade zone (FTZ) and export 
processing zone (EPZ), can be a effective policy tool to reduce such business and 
transaction costs. Such frameworks can provide well-developed infrastructure with 
intensive investment in the demarcated production sites, and also efficient 
administrative procedures including customs and transport facilitation through e.g. 
single-stop and single-window services for export and import, one-stop business 
services including offshore banking and any other logistics, and public supports for 
human resource development and technological transfer. All these services can be made 
possible in SEZ by insulating them from the rest of the country. The aspect of 
implementation capacity of providing these services for foreign investors should not be 
ignored as the Savannakhet case tells us. 
If we follow the Maquila lessons, the “in-bond processing” system among the SEZ 
frameworks shall a core vehicle for facilitating the fragmentation at border areas. In the 
case of Mae Sot – Myawaddy, the system would allow Thai manufacturing companies 
at Mae Sot to set up their branch factories at Myawaddy side, and to leave 
labor-intensive processes such as cutting, making, and packing to their branch factories 
on commission. The necessary machinery, equipment, parts and materials can be 
imported to Myawaddy without any import-customs duties, and the products processed 
                                                 
22
 For instance, the electricity provided from a Thai side is in fact available in Myawaddy. Unless 
the usage of this electricity is admitted legally and regularly, however, the border industries cannot 
enjoy this availability, thereby dampening the incentive for foreign investors to relocate their 
factories there. See Kudo (2009). 
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and assembled at Myawaddy can be re-exported to Thailand or exported to other 
countries with preferential customs duties under such frameworks as free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and Generalized System of Preferences (GSPs).
23
  
The Maquila lesson, at the same time, told us that the benefits of the in-bond 
processing system should be secured independently from other frameworks. In case of 
the Mekong region, the framework of SEZ usually have the in-bond processing function 
and it can be an alternative to the Maquila program.
24
 In the Thai-Myanmar border, the 
same kind of SEZ with the in-bond processing system should be adopted in 
Myawaddy.
25
 The crucial issue is the relationship between the SEZ framework and the 
related free trade agreements (FTAs) such as ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and 
ASEAN plus One. If the FTA framework overrode the in-bond processing system in the 
SEZs as if the NAFTA did the Maquila program, the in-bond processing benefits might 
be phased out in the following ways. First, the duty-free imports of the necessary inputs 
for processing in Myanmar would be confined to the countries within the FTA 
frameworks, and not allowed to its outside countries. Second, even though the duty-free 
imports were allowed within the FTA-related countries, the “Certificate of Origin” in 
exporters, which would impose logistical burdens on exporting companies, would be 
required. The in-bond processing privilege under the SEZ framework should, therefore, 
be secured independently from any FTAs.  
The Maquila program includes not only the special customs treatment but also such 
incentives as foreign investment participation by 100 percent and transferability of any 
personnel. The SEZ in Myawaddy, if applied, should have similar incentive-frameworks, 
in particular, the transferability of the personnel from Thailand to Myanmar. It should 
allow Thai managers and technicians to enter the factories in Myawaddy industrial zone 
with non-immigrant visas, and also should permit Myanmar migrant workers in 
Thailand to come back to the Myanmar site without strict procedures. It would 
contribute to job creation in Myanmar side and also to skill development in Myanmar 
workers through the on-the-job training from migrant-experienced workers to 
newly-entered workers in manufacturing sectors. 
In sum, the adaptation of the SEZ including the in-bond processing system might 
                                                 
23
 The changes in GSPs of EU may also encourage the fragmentation from Thailand to Myanmar. 
Thailand will graduate from GSP of EU in January 2015, and Myanmar will be applied by GSP for 
LDC (least developed countries) from July 2013. 
24
 For instance, the SEZ with in-bond processing function is established in Cambodia (see 
“Sub-Decree No. 148 on the Establishment and Management of the Special Economic Zone” dated 
December 29, 2005), and in Lao PDR (see “Decree of the Prime Minister on the Management 
Regulations and Incentive Policies regarding the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone, Ref. No. 
177/PM” dated November 13, 2003). 
25
 As of today (July 21, 2013), the draft of the SEZ law, which is supposed to have the in-bond 
processing framework in Myanmar, is under discussion in its Parliament. 
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contribute to the creation of the IPN and the development of manufacturing-related 
industries at Mae Sot as well as that at Myawaddy, as if the Maquila program 
contributed a lot to the development of the US border cities from spillover effects as 
well as of Mexican economy.
26
 
 
Enhancing Outer-link connectivity   
The border areas would not be developed if the areas were isolated and were not 
linked with domestic and foreign markets, as the Maquila case suggested the 
modernization of infrastructure in accordance with its geographical expansion. The Mae 
Sot – Myawaddy border will also need the infrastructure to secure the outer-link 
connectivity towards such big cities as Bangkok and Yangon, and the largest 
shortcomings consists in a road network in Myanmar side. 
According to the truck-running test from Ayutthaya to Yangon conducted by 
JETRO in 2012 (Table 5), it took 68 hours, around 3 days, which are far faster than the 
necessary days, 21 days, for the sea transportation between Bangkok and Yangon. It 
should be noted, however, that among the total 68 hours, the waiting time of 35 hours is 
exceeding the truck running time of 26 hours. The waiting time is composed of the one 
for the border gate to be opened, and the one for the traffic control to be lifted. While 
the opening time at the border gate is from 6:00am to 18:00pm, the truck arrived at the 
border gate at 18:50pm, and thus had to wait at the gate until 6:00am on next day. In 
addition, since the road from Myawaddy to Kawkareik, an inland city of Myanmar is 
quite narrow and hilly, the traffic is controlled in one-way from day to day, and thus the 
truck had to wait until another day to be allowed for running. On this road section, the 
truck could run at the slowest speed, 18 km/hour. This survey implied that the lead time 
from Ayutthaya to Yangon could be saved by half if the road condition in Myanmar side 
were improved and the border gate were open for 24 hours.
27
 
The outer-link connectivity is not confined to creating road networks, and may be 
related to a matter of community development in each region. Each region has a 
potential to create its own products by using regional resources and to be a site to attract 
tourists, and can communicate each other for their development. In fact, Thailand’s 
regions have experienced the community development in terms of the “one village one 
product” as called “OTOP”, and thus can disseminate their experiences to Myanmar 
                                                 
26
 The “Preliminary Feasibility Study of Special Economic Zone and PPP Scheme in Myawaddy 
and Hpa-an” has been conducted in 2013, funded by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
Government of Japan. At the side of Mae Sot, Government of Thailand is considering to set up 
SEZ, too.    
27
 Thai government has a plan to construct an alternative road from Myawaddy to Kawkareik. JICA 
is also about to start its feasibility study. 
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side. The connectivity should not be a mere transporting method, but should be a 
catalyst for the community development. 
 
Securing Labor Forces with Skill Development 
One of the “border bonuses”, namely, endowment of low-cost labor forces does not 
automatically guarantee the acquisition of necessary workers for border industries, and 
also the appropriate job opportunities for potential workers, since there might usually be 
a gap between labor demand and supply especially in terms of labor quality at border 
areas. The lessons from Maquila case and Savannakhet one also told us the necessity for 
improvement of labor skill as a prerequisite of their developments. 
The case of Mae Sot – Myawaddy development is not an exception on the serious 
needs for labor forces with necessary skills. In case the industrial estate is developed 
and fully invested by manufacturing companies in Myawaddy, it will require a lot of 
manufacturing workers, by more than a hundred thousands of workers. These worker’s 
demands can be matched by the new entry of domestic workers in Myanmar and also 
the return of migrant workers from Thailand.
28
 In Thailand side, in accordance with 
industrial reformation from labor-intensive operations toward higher-value-added ones, 
the new demands for the skilled managers, technicians and other specialists may arise. 
The TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training) should, therefore, be 
reinforced for labor skill developments targeting the human resources at the border area 
in both Mae Sot and Myawaddy sides. The TVET sites should be located at the moment 
in Mae Sot side, since the manufacturing production bases have existed in Thailand side 
and it has enabled the TVET to include the on-the-job-training in the factories as well as 
the off-the-job-training in the classroom. The JICA research project entitled “Job 
Creation by Border Area Development between Thailand and Myanmar, Phase II” is 
now considering a TVET comprehensive strategy at Mae Sot. The strategy is composed 
of three programs: 1) the program targeting Thai personnel for providing such skills as 
management, accounting, etc. for supply-chain management and as fashion, design, 
quality control, etc. for high value-added operations; 2) the program targeting Myanmar 
workers including migrants for providing basic and technical skills for factory-working; 
and 3) the program for community development including the dissemination of Thai 
OTOP experiences. To materialize these strategies, the inter-governmental group in 
Thailand has been set up under this project. This project also pursues the collaboration 
between Thai-Myanmar TVET institutes in terms of the exchanges of their trainers and 
trainees. 
                                                 
28
 See the Phase I report of the JICA research project “Job Creation by Border Area Development 
between Thailand and Myanmar” in March, 2013.  
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2.5 Summary 
This section focused on the border area development in Mekong region, which is a 
crucial issue for the connectivity in a continental area. Since the border areas have their 
own area-advantages called “border bonuses”: “complementary factor endowment” and 
“cross-border infrastructure services”, the areas might be the real gateways for IPN 
penetration across the countries in Mekong region, if their development were carefully 
designed. This was proved by the success stories of forerunners: the Maquila case at 
US-Mexico border and the Savannakhet SEZ at Thai-Lao PDR border. Considering 
their lessons, the strategies for border area development should be careful designing of 
institutional frameworks for Special Economic Zone (SEZ), enhancing outer-link 
connectivity from borders to central cities, and securing labor forces with skill 
developments. 
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Table 1 The trends in Thailand’s trade of machinery parts and components 
 
  
Thailand's exports to: 2010/2000
mil.dollars % of total mil.dollars % of total mil.dollars % of total growth
CLMV 7 0.2 278 1.4 1,359 3.5 4.9
  Cambodia 0 0.0 27 0.1 198 0.5 7.4
  Lao PDR 6 0.2 53 0.3 120 0.3 2.3
  Myanmar 1 0.0 34 0.2 106 0.3 3.1
  Vietnam 0 0.0 164 0.8 935 2.4 5.7
Advanced ASEAN 1,009 29.6 4,927 25.2 8,664 22.2 1.8
  Indonesia 16 0.5 256 1.3 1,768 4.5 6.9
  Malaysia 102 3.0 1,217 6.2 2,819 7.2 2.3
  Philippines 51 1.5 479 2.4 1,094 2.8 2.3
  Singapore 839 24.6 2,976 15.2 2,983 7.6 1.0
China 2 0.0 939 4.8 3,696 9.5 3.9
India 4 0.1 158 0.8 980 2.5 6.2
Japan 525 15.4 2,989 15.3 5,235 13.4 1.8
United States 953 28.0 3,419 17.5 3,624 9.3 1.1
World 3,409 100.0 19,553 100.0 39,100 100.0 2.0
Thailand's imports from: 2010/2000
mil.dollars % of total mil.dollars % of total mil.dollars % of total growth
CLMV 0 0.0 208 1.0 398 0.9 1.9
  Cambodia 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 4.9
  Lao PDR 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 0.0 -
  Myanmar 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.0 6.7
  Vietnam 0 0.0 207 1.0 379 0.8 1.8
Advanced ASEAN 840 10.1 4,420 20.8 7,168 15.6 1.6
  Indonesia 2 0.0 213 1.0 894 1.9 4.2
  Malaysia 83 1.0 1,621 7.6 3,060 6.6 1.9
  Philippines 25 0.3 932 4.4 1,196 2.6 1.3
  Singapore 730 8.8 1,654 7.8 2,018 4.4 1.2
China 43 0.5 1,128 5.3 7,294 15.8 6.5
India 25 0.3 19 0.1 306 0.7 15.8
Japan 4,219 50.9 6,850 32.2 15,986 34.7 2.3
United States 1,190 14.3 3,685 17.3 3,516 7.6 1.0
World 8,296 100.0 21,262 100.0 46,034 100.0 2.2
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
Note: As for the definition of “machinery parts and components”, see Kimura and Obashi (2010) (HS 1992 
classification).
1990 2000 2010
1990 2000 2010
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Table 2a Gravity Model Estimation on Thailand’s Exports 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The figure in 
parenthesis denotes standard error. 
Sources: UN Comtrade; World Development Indicators and Logistic Performance Index by the World 
Bank; World Economic Outlook Database (October 2010 and 2012) and IFS by IMF  
Dependent variables Thailand's exports: Exp it
Equation (1a) Equation (1b) Equation (2) Equation (3)
Const. -28.161 *** -23.244 *** -23.796 *** -37.011 ***
(0.895) (0.910) (0.930) (2.408)
Joint GDP: ln(Y i*Y t) 0.974 *** 0.973 *** 1.031 *** 1.117 ***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.025)
Joint GDP per capita: ln(Y i/p i*Y t/p t) 0.176 *** 0.203 ***
(0.022) (0.023)
Gap of GDP per capita: ln((Y i/p i-Y t/p t)
2
) 0.031 *** -0.035 *
(0.011) (0.018)
Logistic: ln(LPI i)/ln(Y i/P i) 16.534 ***
(2.682)
Distance: ln(D it) -0.836 *** -1.352 *** -1.313 *** -1.173 ***
(0.050) (0.044) (0.045) (0.073)
Real Exchange Rate: ln(rex i) -0.172 ** -0.262 *** -0.280 *** 1.283 ***
(0.079) (0.083) (0.091) (0.429)
Cambodia_9095 3.570 *** 2.085 * 1.871 -
Cambodia_9600 2.944 *** 1.440 ** 1.203 -
Cambodia_0105 2.145 *** 0.659 0.466 -
Cambodia_0610 2.185 *** 0.742 0.553 0.978
Laos_9095 2.684 *** 1.166 * 1.019 -
Laos_9600 3.855 *** 2.349 *** 2.173 *** -
Laos_0105 2.848 *** 1.347 * 1.207 -
Laos_0610 2.141 *** 0.666 0.561 1.250 *
Myanmar_9095 1.103 * -0.310 -0.782 -
Myanmar_9600 1.760 ** 0.314 -0.123 -
Myanmar_0105 1.549 ** 0.118 -0.284 -
Myanmar_0610 0.382 -1.044 -1.392 * -0.275
Vietnam_9095 1.507 0.366 0.008 -
Vietnam_9600 1.950 *** 0.767 0.442 -
Vietnam_0105 2.227 *** 1.056 0.781 -
Vietnam_0610 2.011 *** 0.878 0.619 0.399
Advanced ASEAN_9095 2.781 ***
Advanced ASEAN_9600 2.869 ***
Advanced ASEAN_0105 2.899 ***
Advanced ASEAN_0610 2.136 ***
Number of observations 2,834 2,834 2,834 827
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Table 2b Gravity Model Estimation on Thailand’s Imports 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The figure in 
parenthesis denotes standard error. 
Sources: UN Comtrade; World Development Indicators and Logistic Performance Index by the World 
Bank; World Economic Outlook Database (October 2010 and 2012) and IFS by IMF  
Dependent variables
Equation (1a) Equation (1b) Equation (2) Equation (3)
Const. -40.755 *** -29.606 *** -31.592 *** -68.941 ***
(2.020) (1.905) (2.011) (5.387)
Joint GDP: ln(Y i*Y t) 0.979 *** 0.958 *** 1.101 *** 1.425 ***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.052)
Joint GDP per capita: ln(Y i/p i*Y t/p t) 0.667 *** 0.679 ***
(0.040) (0.043)
Gap of GDP per capita: ln((Y i/p i-Y t/p t)
2
) 0.165 *** 0.172 ***
(0.019) (0.032)
Logistic: ln(LPI i)/ln(Y i/P i) 17.307 **
(6.719)
Distance: ln(D it) -0.846 *** -1.761 *** -1.497 *** -1.450 ***
(0.102) (0.086) (0.086) (0.146)
Real Exchange Rate: ln(rex i) 0.794 *** 0.376 0.465 * 4.152 ***
(0.257) (0.256) (0.276) (1.013)
Cambodia_9095 -2.706 -5.471 *** -6.007 *** -
Cambodia_9600 -1.366 -4.115 *** -4.538 *** -
Cambodia_0105 -0.435 -3.213 *** -3.582 *** -
Cambodia_0610 -0.904 -3.651 *** -4.068 *** -3.006 **
Laos_9095 -0.521 -3.232 *** -3.639 *** -
Laos_9600 -2.862 ** -5.605 *** -5.892 *** -
Laos_0105 1.298 -1.482 -1.777 -
Laos_0610 2.967 *** 0.154 0.019 1.601
Myanmar_9095 -2.531 * -5.166 *** -6.557 *** -
Myanmar_9600 -1.029 -3.732 *** -4.821 *** -
Myanmar_0105 0.494 -2.177 * -3.232 *** -
Myanmar_0610 -0.326 -3.108 *** -3.963 *** -1.588
Vietnam_9095 -0.949 -3.034 -4.014 -
Vietnam_9600 4.147 *** 2.013 * 1.334 -
Vietnam_0105 4.366 *** 2.247 ** 1.625 -
Vietnam_0610 4.709 *** 2.593 ** 1.990 * 1.882
Advanced ASEAN_9095 3.115 ***
Advanced ASEAN_9600 3.743 ***
Advanced ASEAN_0105 4.430 ***
Advanced ASEAN_0610 4.418 ***
Number of observations 2,234 2,234 2,234 728
Thailand's imports: Imp it
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Table 3 GDP Per Capita and Logistics Performance Index in ASEAN 
 
  
Singapore Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia Vietnam Lao PDR Cambodia Myanmar
GDP per capita (US dollar) in 2010
43,865 8,737 4,992 2,123 2,981 1,174 1,105 753 742
Logistics Performance Index 2012
4.13 3.49 3.18 3.02 2.94 3.00 2.50 2.56 2.37
   Global Ranking in Logistics Performance Index 2012 (Total: 155 countries)
1 29 38 52 59 53 109 101 129
     <Customs>
1 29 42 67 75 61 94 108 122
     <Infrastructure>
2 27 43 62 84 72 107 127 133
     <International shipments>
2 27 36 55 57 38 124 103 117
     <Logistics competence>
6 30 48 39 61 81 105 103 111
     <Tracking & tracing>
6 29 45 38 51 48 111 78 129
     <Timeliness>
1 28 39 69 41 38 118 103 140
Sources:
   GDP per capita: World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012, IMF
   Logistics Performance Index 2012: The World Bank, (http://lpisurvey.worldbank.org/international/global)
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Figure 1 Development of Industrial Zones at Border Areas in Mekong Region 
 
  Source: Author 
 
Table 4 Border Trade between Thailand and Lao PDR through Customs Houses in 
the Northeastern Region 
 
 
  
Koh Kong 
Poipet
Savannakhet
Myawaddy – Mae Sot
Dawei – Hit Khee
Bavet – Moc Bai
Dansavann – Lao Bao
Planned Zones
Actual Zones
(Unit: Millions of Baht)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
16,562 18,013 20,691 36,187 43,484 55,841 54,816 78,721 115,347 155,979
Nong Kai 7,206 7,100 7,380 18,318 23,730 29,072 31,079 36,138 45,346 62,136
Mukdahan 3,722 5,288 5,372 6,419 6,347 10,298 7,875 23,709 47,836 64,328
4,051 4,599 4,936 12,569 17,231 19,364 15,908 21,313 32,314 44,530
Nong Kai 808 1,150 1,165 1,507 1,560 2,053 2,314 2,799 2,383 3,853
Mukdahan 741 620 955 6,531 12,654 13,739 9,422 14,555 24,760 34,120
20,613 22,612 25,627 48,757 60,716 75,206 70,724 100,034 147,662 200,512
Nong Kai 8,014 8,250 8,545 19,825 25,290 31,124 33,393 38,937 47,729 65,989
Mukdahan 4,463 5,907 6,327 12,950 19,001 24,037 17,297 38,264 72,596 98,448
Source: Website of the Bank of Thailand. It uses the data of customs houses in the northeastern region
Export
Import
Trade Value
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Table 5 Truck-running Test from Ayutthaya to Yangon 
 
Source: JETRO, 2012 
Total time needed (hours: minutes) for 870 km 68:25
Truck running time 26:36
   Ayutthaya - Mae Sot border (km/hour) for 445 km 10:28 (57.1)
   Myawaddy border - Yangon (km/hour) for 425 km 16:08 (40.5)
      (Myawaddy - Kawkareik for 54 km) 02:57 (18.2)
Waiting time 35:45
   Waiting for border-gate to be opened 14:45
   Waiting for traffic control to be lifted 21:00
Costum procedures 05:54
   Export at Mae Sot 00:30
   Import as Myawaddy 05:24
Transshipment 00:10
Reference: Sea transportation between BKK and Yangon  21 days
